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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION AS A VARIABLE IN
INDUSTRIAL SITE LOCATION
SHELDON J. PLAGER*
The availability of a water supply is of vital concern to
industry. This availability may be affected as much by
the applicable legal doctrine as by the accessibility of an
adequate water supply. Professor Plager explores the two
major riparian doctrines that apply to surface water sup-
plies: "natural flow" and "reasonable use." He con-
cludes that, although the theoretical differences between
the two doctrines are often blurred, practical differences
are present.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the viewpoint of economic and political influences and
from that of water allocation, the industrial water user in the
Eastern United States has assumed a position of tremendous im-
portance.' A measure of industrial water use commonly em-
ployed is the quantity of water circulated per unit of manufac-
ture. In these terms, it takes from 38,000 to 184,000 gallons of water
to produce one ton of paper and 660,000 gallons to produce one ton
of synthetic rubber.2 One source of such tremendous quantities of
water is a concentrated surface waterbody: a stream or lake.3
A study by the Bureau of the Census in 1954 of the 10,237 manu-
* Visiting Research Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Profes-
sor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., 1952, University of North Carolina;
J.D., 1958, University of Florida; LL.M., 1961, Columbia University.
1 In order to make more meaningful the ramifications of the riparian
doctrines to an industrial society, a hypothetical industrial concern should
be assumed. This industry desires to establish a new plant, perhaps to
produce pulp and paper or synthetic rubber. The plant's water require-
ments and the availability of a supply to meet them will be a major con-
sideration in a decision on a site. See, e.g., N.Y. WATER INFO. CENTER,
WATER'S ROLE IN PLANT LOCATION (1960). See also address by Leonard
Pasek, National Conference on Water Pollution, Wash., D.C., Dec. 13, 1960,
entitled The Needs and Obligations of Private Industry. Determination of
a plant's water requirements will be complicated by the fact that evalua-
tion of industrial use of water is a highly complex matter, due in part to
the variety of ways in which water is used in the manufacture of different
products and even among different plants producing identical products.
2 See Mussey, Water Requirements of the Pulp & Paper Industry,
Water Supply Paper 1330-A (USGS 1955); Woodard, Availability of Water
in the U.S. with Special Reference to Industrial Needs by 1980 (Industrial
College of Armed Forces 1957). To the extent a plant reuses its water
these figures do not necessarily reflect intake requirements.
3 In addition to quantitative requirements, qualitative considerations
may be influential if not controlling in plant site locations. Here again
requirements vary with the type of product manufactured and the type of
use to which the water is put.
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facturing establishments whose gross water intake for that year
was 20 million gallons or more disclosed that of the 11,324 billion
gallons of water intake of these establishments, 6,905 billion, or
60 percent, came from company surface water systems.4
The common law approach to the allocation of concentrated sur-
face water supplies,5 as it originally developed in England, was
heavily influenced by economic and geographic conditions. During
the formative years of the doctrine a combination of humid cli-
mate,6 relatively flat terrain interlaced with many small running
streams and brooks but few large rivers or lakes,7 and a more or
less static agricultural economy lent itself to a water use policy
that in some aspects is perhaps more accurately characterized as a
policy of nonuse.
The ultimate statement of this policy took the form of the maxim
aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat,8 (the strict "natural
flow" theory) which, freely translated, means that an occupier of
riparian land 9 was entitled to make use of the water of a stream
flowing past his land only for uses on or connected with the ripar-
ian land, and only if he returned it to the stream substantially
undiminished in quantity and unchanged in quality.10
One exception to the limitations on use was recognized: An occu-
pier of land using water for "ordinary," "domestic," or "natural"
purposes" was entitled to withdraw all the water he needed, even
though it meant taking the entire flow of the stream.12 Undoubt-
4 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, INDUS. WATER USE SuPP., Bull. MC-
209, table 2 (1960).
5 The term "concentrated surface water" is used to distinguish streams,
and to some extent lakes, from other types of surface water, such as
marshes and rainwater. These latter are sometimes referred to in the cases
as diffused surface water, but equally often as simply surface water.
6 In England the average annual rainfall is from 25 to 60 inches. 5 R.
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 354 n.20 (1956).
7 It was not until 1878 that England had clear precedent applying the
common law of streams to other water bodies, such as lakes. Bristow v.
Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641 (1878). Because of the late date of this decision
it is not part of the common law as such in most American jurisdictions,
although it has generally been followed. E.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371 (1891); Turner v. Holland, 65 Mich. 453, 33 N.W. 283 (1887).
8 See, e.g., Shury v. Piggot, 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (1625). See also Pinney
v. Luce, 44 Minn. 367, 46 N.W. 561 (1890).
9 For a discussion of what constitutes riparian land, see Davis, Water
Rights in Iowa, 41 IOWA L. REV. 216, 220 (1956); Note, 5 S.C.L.Q. 178 (1952).
See Maloney & Plager, Florida's Streams, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 294, 306 (1957).
10 See, e.g., McCartney v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly Ry. Co., [1904]
A.C. 301; Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts & Berks Canal Navigation Co.,
L.R. 7 H.L. 697 (1875). But see Kensit v. Great Eastern Ry., 23 Ch. D. 566,
27 Ch. D. 122 (1884); Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851), invoking
a de minimus type limitation to the policy.
11 The terms are found in the cases singly or in various combinations,
conjunctively or disjunctively joined.
12 See, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra; Miner v. Gilmour, 14 Eng. Rep. 861
(1858).
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edly those uses usually attributable to the operation of a farm, the
economic and social unit then predominant, were intended to be
within this exception: drinking, cooking, washing, and the watering
of farm animals. Uses that did not fit in this picture were pre-
sumably not entitled to the benefit of the exception status; they
were either permitted riparian uses subject to the strict require-
ments of noninterference with the flow to downstream riparians, or
they were nonriparian and therefore nonpermitted uses.
The relevance of English law lies in the fact that the vast bulk of
surface water withdrawal for industrial use takes place in the 31
American jurisdictions 13 that have established and maintained their
water law primarily within the framework of the riparian sys-
tem.14 Thus they share common roots in this English case law, or
in the influential formulations of the law by early text writers
such as Chancellor Kent. 15 These jurisdictions share with England
the sometime advantages of a humid climate; but topographical, cul-
tural, and economic differences, the last two tremendously acceler-
ated during the last century or so, have resulted in substantial
alterations of the statement and application of the controlling
principles of water law.
There appear to be only four American jurisdictions that give
verbal recognition to the natural flow (English) doctrine as their
governing law: Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Vir-
ginia.'6 Most of the other 31 states subscribe to a later-appearing
version of riparianism known as the doctrine of reasonable use;
some states seem to talk both; a few states have not spoken. The
purpose of this article is to compare the water allocation patterns
obtaining in a natural flow jurisdiction with those of a reasonable
use jurisdiction, and to make a preliminary evaluation of these pat-
terns from the viewpoint of the industrial water user and from that
of the public interest in optimum water usage.
The question of the place in this theoretical framework of a
water-using industry situated on riparian land is of more than
academic interest to the industrial user relying for continued ex-
istence on the availability of a water supply. Three alternatives are
offered. The use of water by an industrial plant physically located
on riparian land and without material effect (quantitatively or
qualitatively) on the flow of the stream, may be deemed a non-
riparian and therefore nonpermitted use, with the result that it
can be enjoined even though no actual injury to downstream ri-
13 This includes all states east of the tier of states extending from the
Dakotas to Texas. The 50th state, Hawaii, is generally classed as a riparianjurisdiction, but it is not included in this study of jurisdictions of the con-
tinental United States.
14 Mackichan, Estimated Use of Water in the United States, 1955, Geo.
Survey Circ. 398, fig.4 (1957).
15 See, e.g., J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (13th ed. 1884).
16 See 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 359 (1956).
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parians results.17 Although some support for this position may be
found by analogy to cases in which a municipality located on a
stream is denied riparian status for purposes of making with-
drawals to supply its inhabitants, 8 this position would seem highly
out of keeping with a modern industrial society. No English cases
have directly taken this position.19
A second possibility, at the opposite end of the scale, is to treat
withdrawals of water by an industry as a type of ordinary or domes-
tic use per se. This position received support in one English case,
on the theory that industrial uses may be so common in some locales
that they can properly be classed as a primary use and treated in
the same way as domestic uses in agTicultural areas.20  Several
English text writers have adopted this theory.21
The third alternative, and the one discussed in this article, also
finds support among English judges and text writers.22  It is to
treat industrial use as a use, that is, a permissible riparian use, but
not one that qualifies for the preferred status of ordinary or domes-
tic use.28 This position makes the most sense, since it preserves the
flow of a stream for uses in addition to that of industry while at
the same time permitting beneficial utilization of water by indus-
trial riparian occupiers.
II. THE INDUSTRIAL WATER USER AS A RIPARIAN
A. The Doctrine of Natural Flow as Exemplified by Georgia
The basic technique for founding a claim in a concentrated
surface water source in a riparian jurisdiction is to assume the
status of a riparian-an occupier of riparian land. How well will
an industry fare if it establishes a plant on a riparian site in an
American jurisdiction that, verbally at least, follows the natural
flow (English) doctrine? Of the natural flow states, Georgia is
17' Cf. Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851); Swindon Waterworks
Co. v. Wilts & Berks Canal Navigation Co., L.R. 7 H.L. 697 (1875).
1s See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941);
Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
19 But see the statement of the argument, based on passages in Elmhirst
v. Spencer, 2 Macn. & G. 45, 50 (1849), in B. MEr.ARRY & H. WADE, REAL
PROPERTY 70 (1957), and a rejection of the argument as requiring a reductio
ad absurdum in Hudson, Industry As a Riparian Use, 22 MODERN L. REV. 35,
36 (1959).
20 Omerod v. Todmorden Mill Co., 11 Q.B.D. 155, 167 (1883). But see
McCartney v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly Ry. Co., [1904] A.C. 301, 306-07.
21 See G. CHESHIRE, MODERN REAL PROPERTY 119 (8th ed. 1958); C. GALE,
EASEMENTS 237 (12th ed. 1950).
22 See Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts & Berks Nay. Co., L.R. 7 H.L.
697 (1875); J. SALMOND, TORTS 223 (12th ed. 1957); Brett, The Right to
Take Flowing Water, 14 CONVEY. (n.s.) 154 (1950).
28 See Hudson, supra note 19, advocating this position. The terms
"extraordinary" or "artificial" are often applied to these permissible, but
nondomestic, uses.
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the least industrial, as evidenced by industrial water use statis-
tics, 24 and best illustrates the "pure" natural flow state.
1. THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT
Georgia, one of the more humid states, has an average annual
precipitation around 50 inches.25 This preciptation averages consid-
erably higher in the mountain and coastal regions. In addition, sea-
sonal and yearly variations cause periods of severe drought and
flood.26 In terms of fresh water intake by manufacturing establish-
ments,2 7 Georgia intake totaled 95 billion gallons in 1954, of which
27 billion, or slightly over one-fourth, came from company surface
water systems. 28 A substantial portion of the state is in the great
Atlantic Coastal Plain aquifer, an unconsolidated and semi-consoli-
dated aquifer offering some of the largest permanent ground water
yields in the country 29 and providing a source of generally high
quality water.30 This fact partly explains why a relatively small
percentage of Georgia's industrial water supply comes from sur-
face water sources.3 '
2. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The earliest Georgia Supreme Court case involving the rights
of riparian occupiers in the use of surface water supplies was
Hendrick v. Thomas,32 in 1848. Plaintiff and defendant were own-
ers of land on opposite sides of Tussehaw Creek. Further down
the creek, defendant erected a dam, raising the level of the creek
adjacent to plaintiff's land approximately one foot. This was not
enough to cause it to overflow its banks. Plaintiff sued for dam-
ages, apparently alleging that there was a shoal in the channel of
the creek adjacent to his upland, that the shoal had value as a pro-
spective site for a mill, and that the raising of the water level over
the shoal made the shoal virtually valueless to him. The trial
24 See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
25 See GEORGIA WATER USE AND CONSERVATION COMMITTEE, WATER IN
GEORGIA 27 (1955).
26 Id. at 28-29.
27 Data based on manufacturing establishments whose gross water intake
for 1954 was 20 million gallons or more.
28 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, supra note 4. The comparable figures
for the other 3 named natural flow jurisdictions are (in billions of gallons):
State Total Company Surface Water Systems
New Jersey 191 91
Pennsylvania 1,354 1,209
West Virginia 462 446
29 See F. ACKERMAN & G. LoF, TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICAN WATER DEVEL-
OPMENT 27, figure 6, at 24 (1959).
30 See note 25 supra.
31 Compare table, note 28 supra.
32 4 Ga. 241 (1848).
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court rendered judgment for defendant on the basis that the mere
raising of the water level within the channel, since it did not flood
plaintiff's land or interfere in any way with his activities, was not
an actionable wrong. The Georgia Supreme Court, in reversing the
judgment, invoked the aqua currit maxim:
Every proprietor of lands ... on the banks of a river, has
. . . an equal right to the use of the water which flows in
the stream adjacent to his lands . . . without diminution
or alteration .... Without the consent of the adjoining
proprietors, [a proprietor] cannot divert or diminish the
quantity of water, which would otherwise descend to the
proprietors below, nor throw the water back on the propri-
etors above . . ..
This did not mean that the only lawful use that could be made of
the stream was to watch the water go by. The court stated that
each riparian proprietor was entitled "to a reasonable use of the
water, for domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes; pro-
vided, that in making such use, he does not work a material injury
to the other proprietors. '3 4
The decision turned on whether interference with plaintiff's
hypothetically possible use of the shoal was a material injury.
The court's determination that it was an injury was an application
of the rule that is perhaps the earmark of the natural flow doc-
trine. The test of the lawfulness of a use is not whether the util-
ity of the use outweighs the gravity of the harm,3 5 but whether the
use invades an abstract right to which plaintiff is deemed entitled.
Although this was the position taken by the court,36 the case is not
necessarily one limited entirely to abstract rights. Tussehaw Creek,
under Georgia law, was a nonnavigable watercourse, and plaintiff as
a riparian proprietor on one side of the creek owned the bed adja-
cent to his upland out to the center thread.3 7  As a result, he
owned that portion of the shoal that was on his half of the bed,
as well as the foot or so of the bank on his side that was put under
water by defendant's dam. 8  The case could be considered as in-
volving a trespass on real property, which the common law recog-
nized as not requiring actual damages as essential to a cause of
action.39
33 Id. at 255 (emphasis omitted).
34 Id. at 256 (emphasis omitted).
35 See RESTATEMENT or TORTS §§ 852-54 (1939).
36 "[T] he act of the defendants throwing back the water ... is an inva-
sion of [plaintiff's] right to exercise the control and dominion over his
property-and ... whenever there has been an illegal invasion of the rights
of another, it is an injury, for which he is entitled to a remedy by an
action." 4 Ga. at 261.
37 GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1302 (1948).
Is 4 Ga. at 265.
39 See generally H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 399 (Abr. ed. 1940). It is
significant, however, that plaintiff's cause of action was brought as trespass
on the case rather than trespass q.c.f. 4 Ga. at 253.
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Nevertheless, Hendrick v. Thomas established the principles fol-
lowed in later cases and codified, at least in part, into positive law.40
In the frequently cited case of Robertson v. Arnold4' the court
left no doubt that a hypothetically possible future use was suffi-
cient basis for a claim for relief. Defendant, a riparian occupier
upstream of plaintiff, was engaged in cutting ditches and establish-
ing a pond on his land so as to draw water from the stream, supply
it to the pond, and then return it to the stream. Plaintiff, a down-
stream riparian, alleged that the combination of evaporation loss
and change in flow pattern would cause material interference with
the flow available to run his water race, which had lain unused
for over 10 years. The supreme court, invoking aqua currit, re-
versed the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer.4 2
On the other hand, a combination of nonuse by plaintiff and
minimal interference by defendant may prevent a recovery. 43 In
Rome Railway & Light Co. v. Loeb,44 plaintiff and defendant were
adjoining landowners with title derived from a common source.
Silver Creek flowed through the land of both. An unused mill
stood on plaintiff's land. The dam created an elongated pond or
reservoir, 30 feet wide and about one and one-fourth miles long, a
part of which extended upstream onto defendant's land. Defend-
ant operated an electric generating plant on his land, drawing some
400,000 gallons of water from the pond daily. The water was re-
turned substantially in its entirety to the pond after use.
40 See GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1301 (1955): "Running water, while on land,
belongs to the owner of the land, but he has no right to divert it from the
usual channel, nor may he so use or adulterate it as to interfere with the
enjoyment of it by the next owner." GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1407 (1956):
The owner of land through which nonnavigable watercourses may
flow is entitled to have the water in such streams come to his land
in its natural and usual flow, subject only to such detention or dimu-
nition as may be caused by a reasonable use of it by other riparian
proprietors; and the diverting of the stream, wholly or in part, from
the same, or the obstructing thereof so as to impede its course or
cause it to overflow or injure his land, or any right appurtenant
thereto, or the pollution thereof so as to lessen its value to him,
shall be a trespass upon his property.
41 182 Ga. 664, 186 S.E. 806 (1936).
42 See also Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co., 132 Ga. 246, 64 S.E. 87 (1909),
in which an upstream dam owner held liable for closing the gate on the
dam from the end of each working day until the beginning of the next, for
the purpose of impounding the whole flow of the stream and thus maximiz-
ing the head available for his wheel, but with the effect of interrupting
the flow to the lower owner; White v. East Lake Land Co., 96 Ga. 415, 23
S.E. 393 (1895).
43 See also Pool v. Lewis, 41 Ga. 162 (1870), in which construction of a
dam so as to provide a head for water power, causing some detention of
the water and some possible evaporation losses as a result of impounding,
was held not in itself an unreasonable use as against a downstream occu-
pier when the flow to the latter was not shown to be materially interfered
with in quantity or regularity.
44 141 Ga. 202, 80 S.E. 785 (1914).
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Plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant's use of the water on the
ground that plaintiff's deed granted her "the mill privileges up the
creek, ' 45 that defendant was not entitled to riparian rights, and that
defendant could not lawfully make any use of the water. The
Georgia Supreme Court concluded that defendant was a riparian
owner, and that the grant of mill privileges to plaintiff from their
common source of title was not a grant of an exclusive privilege
such as to deny defendant his riparian rights. The court then
went on to say:
Having shown that the defendant, as a riparian owner,
had the right to make a reasonable use of the stream and
a reasonable use of the water from the pond adjacent to its
property, provided that it does not thereby materially
interfere with the mill privileges of the plaintiff or other
riparian proprietors, and it not appearing from the peti-
tion that, considering the character of the use to which the
water was put by the defendant or the quantity of water
consumed thereby, there was an unreasonable use of the
water, or that the owner of the mill privileges was materi-
ally injured in consequence of this use or the consump-
tion of the small amount of water, it follows that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to the injunctive relief applied for.46
The Georgia cases appear to support the proposition that a ripar-
ian occupier desirous of detaining and diverting water from a
stream for use in an industrial plant on his riparian land will find
his use considered a permissible riparian use, and the question of
reasonableness will depend on the extent to which the flow to the
lower riparians is maintained in quantity and regularity. Many
of the uses to which water is put in industry, such as cooling, while
requiring large quantities of intake, result in small percentages of
disappearance. One authority estimates that "it is unlikely that
more than 10 per cent of the factory water intake represents actual
water disappearance. ' 47
Even if sufficient disappearance occurs to constitute injury to
lower riparians, the price may well be an acceptable charge to the
cost of production.48 The litigable feature may be obviated by pur-
chase of easements from the lower riparians for interference with
their rights. The feasibility of this depends, of course, on the cost
of the easements and the extent to which a riparian owner may deal
in water rights as an interest separate from his riparian land.
The real danger that the industrial water user faces is that some-
one may enjoin his use of the water in the quantities needed to
maintain his operation, forcing him to close his plant, and perhaps
45 Id. at 203, 80 S.E. at 786.
46 Id. at 208, 80 S.E. at 787-88.
47 E. ACKERMAN & G. LoF, TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICAN WATER DEVELOPMENT
53 (1959).
48 In Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co., 132 Ga. 246, 247, 64 S.E. 87, 88 (1909),
plaintiff asked for damages "in the sum of $1,000 per annum."
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making a substantial investment worthless. From the viewpoint
of the plaintiff, who sees his stream flow being interfered with or
about to be interfered with, the injunction may be preferred to
the common law action for damages. Injunctive relief is preventa-
tive, and in situations in which plaintiff's actual damages are nomi-
nal, it may be the only effective remedy if he is interested in
stopping the violation and not simply in preventing defendant
from gaining a prescriptive right. As suggested previously, the
defendant may be quite willing to write off the price of damages,
especially when nominal, as part of the cost of doing business. Fur-
thermore, even if the damages claimed are substantial, plaintiff
can usually obtain them as an adjunct of the specific relief given in
an injunction suit.49 Establishing the equitable basis for invoking
the extraordinary remedy of injunction causes little difficulty, since
water rights have long been regarded as a type of real property
right and hence the subject of equitable protection as a matter of
course. In addition, the activity involved will often be of the "con-
tinuing wrong" type. 50
However, there are limitations on injunctive relief. In a locale
eager to encourage industry to settle, or where the local economy is
largely dependent upon an already existing industry, public senti-
ment may be an operative force in discouraging plaintiffs from
seeking injunctions, and perhaps courts from granting them. It
is doubtful, though, that the persons whose jobs depend on the
continued financial well-being of the stockholders in an industrial
concern will put much reliance on this factor. 51
Further, courts do not always grant injunctive relief, even
when jurisdictional requirements are met. In the name of laches a
plaintiff may be denied enforcement of a claim when he has con-
tributed to defendant's placing himself in the position of wrong-
doer.52 This doctrine was successfully invoked to deny injunctive
relief to a plaintiff who watched while defendant constructed major
works for utilizing the water in controversy. 53 Or if plaintiff's ac-
tion is obviously an effort to use the courts to force defendant into
a disadvantageous settlement bordering on the exorbitant, the
49 See W. WALSH, EQuITY 179-80 (1930).
50 See, e.g., 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 117 (3d ed. 1939); 1 B. WEIL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 20-21 (3d ed. 1911).
51 In Hill v. Standard Mining Co., 12 Idaho 223, 85 P. 907 (1906), defend-
ant industry argued that the granting of an injunction against continued use
of a water supply would result in the abandonment of the industry there,
the bankruptcy of the local inhabitants, and the depopulation of the county.
The argument found little support among the judges.
52 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Alpena Paper Co., 198 Mich. 165, 164 N.W. 470
(1917); Jones v. McNabb, 184 Okla. 9, 84 P.2d 429 (1938). See also Pub.
Serv. Corp. v. Profile Cotton Mills, 236 Ala. 4, 180 So. 583 (1938).
53 New York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 (1902). See also Brooks v. Pat-
terson, 159 Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947).
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court, on general equitable principles, may deny specific relief.54
But, again, these are possibilities upon which no industrial planner
will rely, and which add little to the ability of the riparian system to
adapt to the needs of the industrial community.
A relatively new doctrine in equity jurisprudence, sometimes
called "balancing the equities," involves a basic policy reorientation
by the courts and has possibilities of operating as a significant factor
in the adjustment process of Eastern water law. It is an accepted
tenet of equity jurisprudence that the chancellor has discretion
to refuse an injunction pendente lite in the absence of a showing that
a refusal of injunctive relief at this early stage will work serious
hardship on the complainant. 55 But at later stages of the proceed-
ings, the chancellor is often unwilling to balance the relative hard-
ships of the parties, so that if the complainant established a basis
for equitable jurisdiction and a right to relief, the injunction
would issue without a separate consideration of the extent of the
wrong as compared with the cost of the remedy.5 6 In recent years,
however, there has been a tendency in some jurisdictions to bal-
ance the equities and withhold specific relief when in the chan-
cellor's judgment it would be inequitable to grant it.57
This doctrine of balancing the equities has been successfully in-
voked in several cases involving water pollution,58 particularly
when there was a substantial public interest in the continuation of
the activity of the wrongdoer. Typical cases have involved a mu-
nicipality disposing of sewage,59 or an industry important to the
local economy releasing effluent.6 ° But in cases involving with-
drawals from a surface water source, and in which the interests
immediately represented were only those of private litigants, the
doctrine has not found general favor.61 In several Georgia cases in
which the facts could have justified an application of the doctrine,
the Georgia Supreme Court has been adamant in refusing to with-
54 See, e.g., Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); McCann
v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914).
55 See 5 J. POMEROY, EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
§ 1949 (4th ed. 1919).
56 See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E.
805 (1913); Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 A. 125 (1892); 5 J. POMEROY,
supra note 55.
57 See generally Note, The Trend to Balance the Injuries, 4 S.C.L.Q. 540
(1952).
58 See generally Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the
Southeastern States, Particularly As Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159
(1952).
59 Lakeland v. State ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940);
accord, Kentucky Elec. Devel. Co. v. Wells, 256 Ky. 203, 75 S.W.2d 1088
(1934).
60 E.g., Montgomery Limestone Co. v. Bearden, 256 Ala. 269, 54 So. 2d
571 (1951); Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d
442 (1947); Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231
(1934).
61 See Maloney, supra note 58.
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hold specific relief.62
B. The Doctrine of Reasonable Use As Exemplified by Michigan
It was earlier stated that the natural flow doctrine is to be dis-
tinguished from a later-appearing version of riparianism known as
"reasonable use." To the extent that this statement suggests a
clear demarcation between the two theories, with a given set of
legal consequences flowing from the adoption of one or the other,
the statement is an oversimplification. 3 Courts frequently reach a
desired result with little regard for nicely stated theories; it is not
always possible to tell which theory a court considers to be the law
of its jurisdiction. And even in jurisdictions operating under the
name of one theory or the other, the handling of alternatives avail-
able in differing factual problems is by no means necessarily con-
sistent with that of other similarly labeled jurisdictions.
In the manufacturing belt of the United States-the area east of
the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio and the Potomac,6 4 an
area that includes about half of the country's population, about
half of the market, some 70 percent of the labor force, the sources of
supply of most parts and materials directly used in manufacturing, 5
and between two-thirds and three-fourths of the industrial water
intake66 -there is no consistent pattern of water law upon which
an industrial user can rely. Pennsylvania purports to follow the
natural flow doctrine, although not in all particulars is it identical
with that of Georgia. T Illinois has cases that speak the language of
62 Robertson v. Arnold, 182 Ga. 664, 186 S.E. 806 (1936); Chestatee
Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 118 Ga. 255, 45 S.E. 267
(1903). See note 44 supra and accompanying text. But see Rome Ry. &
Light Co. v. Loeb, 141 Ga. 202, 80 S.E. 785 (1914), reversing an injunction
against use of water by a power plant providing a city with power. The
court pointed out that if water was not available to the plant it would
necessitate use of a "cooling tower," using city water, with additional annual
expenditure of about $3,000. See also City of Elberton v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 749,
49 S.E. 779 (1905), in which an injunction sought against the diverter, a
municipality in need of a water supply, was successful; the case, however,
involved a diversion to nonriparian land.
63 Perpetuation of such oversimplifications is not unknown. See, e.g., 4
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 849 Introductory Note, at 341 (1939) (setting out
the two theories and the given consequences of each).
64 This includes part or all of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey, New York and the lower New England states. See
S. de Geer, American Manufacturing Belt, 9 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 233-59
(1927). See also map by Jones, Areal Distribution of Manufacturing in the
United States, in WATER FOR INDUSTRY 24 (Am. Ass'n for the Advancement
of Science Pub. No. 45, 1956).
65 Burrill, Geographic Distribution of Manufacturing, in WATER FOR IN-
DUSTRY, supra note 64, at 25.
66 Id. at 29; 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, supra note 4, table 11.
67 See, e.g., Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 280 Pa.
492, 124 A. 747 (1924); Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 145 Pa. 438, 22 A. 989
(1891); Lehigh Coal & Nay. Co. v. Scranton Gas & Water Co., 6 Pa. Dist.
291 (C.P. Lackawanna Co. 1897).
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natural flow,68 cases that speak the language of reasonable use,6 9
and some that seem to speak both simultaneously 0 New York
presents an almost unique problem to the industrial water user; it
is one of the few jurisdictions in which a major portion of industrial
water supply is obtained through public water systems, rather than
through company owned surface or ground-water systems.7 1 Ohio72
and Michigan 73 have expressly declined to follow the natural flow
theory, and have developed their own versions of reasonable use.
Michigan will be used to illustrate the allocation pattern in a rea-
sonable use jurisdiction.
1. THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT
Michigan, like Georgia, is a humid state. Although it has substan-
tially less annual precipitation than Georgia,7 4 it has the advantage
of some 3,000 miles of shoreline bordering on the Great Lakes and
approximately 11,000 inland lakes and 35,000 miles of streams.7 5
As an industrial water-using state, Michigan has a fresh water in-
take almost seven times greater than Georgia.7 6 Of the 657 billion
gallons of fresh water intake by manufacturing establishments 7
in Michigan in 1954, 513 billion, or 78 percent, came from company
surface water systems.78
2. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The leading case in Michigan is Dumont v. Kellogg, decided in
1874. 7 9 The case involved two mill owners desiring to utilize a
stream that flowed through their properties for water power.
Defendant erected his mill upstream of the plaintiff's already ex-
isting mill, and constructed a mill dam across the stream. The
reservoir created by the dam was quite large.8 0  The evidence
indicated that the flow downstream to the plaintiff was reduced as
much as one-third of normal. The trial court applied the principle
68 Plumleigh v. Dawson, 6 Ill. 544 (1844).
69 Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Ill. 67 (1867).
70 Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 38 Am. Dec. 106 (1842).
71 See Burrill, supra note 65, at 32: "New York is the only highly indus-
trialized state depending primarily on municipal systems (56%)."
72 The leading case is City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19 (1902).
73 The leading case is Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874).
74 About 30 inches per year. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1960, table 222, at 172.
75 See Arens, Michigan Law of Water Allocation, in THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 377 (1958).
76 Six hundred and fifty-seven billion gallons as compared with 95 bil-
lion. 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, supra note 4.
77 Data based on manufacturing establishments whose gross water in-
take for 1954 was 20 million gallons or more.
78 1954 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, supra. note 4, at 78.
79 29 Mich. 420 (1874).
80 Id.
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of aqua currit:
[N]o proprietor has the right to use the water to the
prejudice of the proprietors below him .. .he cannot di-
vert or diminish the quantity which would otherwise de-
scend to the proprietors below. . . . The rights of a ripar-
ian proprietor are not to be measured by the reasonable
demands of his business. His right extends to the use of
only so much of the stream as will not materially diminish
its quantity, so that in this case the question whether de-
fendant needs the water as he uses it in his business is en-
tirely immaterial.8 '
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment for the
plaintiff, and said:
But as between two proprietors, neither of whom has
acquired superior rights to the other, it cannot be said that
one 'has no right to use the water to the prejudice of the
proprietor below him,' or that he cannot lawfully 'diminish
the quantity which would descend to the proprietor be-
low,' or that 'he must so use the water as not materially to
affect the application of the water below, or materially to
diminish its quantity.' Such a rule would be in effect this:
that the lower proprietor must be allowed the enjoyment of
his full common-law rights as such, not diminished, re-
strained, or in any manner limited or qualified by the rights
of the upper proprietor, and must receive the water in its
natural state as if no proprietorship above him existed.
Such a rule could not be the law so long as equality of
right between the several proprietors was recognized, for
it is manifest it would give to the lower proprietor superior
advantages over the upper, and in many cases give him
in effect a monopoly of the stream.8 2
The question as the court saw it was not whether the lower
proprietor suffered damage as a result of the use, or whether the
quantity flowing to him was diminished, but whether "under all
the circumstances of the case the use of the water by one is reason-
able and consistent with a correspondent enjoyment of right by
the other."83 "In other words, the injury that is incidental to a
reasonable enjoyment of the common right can demand no re-
dress."8 4
Later cases suggest that a "domestic" user will be entitled to use
all water needed to satisfy his preferred use; the reasonable use
test will not apply.8 5 This seems to be a recognition of the same
81 Id.
82 Id. at 422.
83 Id. at 423.
84 Id. at 424.
85 Masterbrook v. Alger, 110 Mich. 414, 68 N.W. 213 (1896). But see
People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902) (involving two do-
mestic-type users and applying the reasonable use test).
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preferential use rule operating as an exception to the natural flow
doctrine; 6 and the same kinds of use--drinking, cooking, bathing,
and watering domestic cattle in connection with a household or
farm-are involved.8 7
The Dumont proposition is that the fact that a riparian sustains
actual injury as a result of the activity of another riparian, through
reduction of flow or otherwise, is not a basis for redress if the
actor's activity is "reasonable. 8 8 It seems to follow, although not
necessarily, that a use by a riparian that is unreasonable will es-
tablish liability, even though no actual damage is sustained by
other riparians. This situation can arise, for example, when the
complainant is a nonuser. Implicit is the assumption that a use
may be unreasonable even though it causes no actual loss to others;
or, stated another way, that actual injury is not a necessary in-
gredient of a finding of unreasonableness. This proposition finds
support in Dumont. The court took pains to distinguish the prob-
lem before it from a case in which there was a withdrawal of
water from a stream sufficient to deprive the lower proprietor of
the flow entirely. As to the latter situation the court said: "No
person has a right to cause such a diversion, and it is wholly a
wrongful act, for which an action will lie without proof of special
damage."8 9 The close kinship to the predilections of the natural
flow courts is obvious.
Justification of this result in theory requires a criterion of rea-
sonableness that does not consider defendant's activity merely as it
bears on plaintiff,90 but one that evaluates defendant's activity
against an abstract standard, of which the effect on plaintiff may
be considered as only one factor.91 A more or less arbitrary de-
termination that a certain act is per se unreasonable is one possible
result of such a criterion. Another possible result is that a court
86 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946); People
v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156,.91 N.W. 211 (1902); Pettibone v. Maclem, 45
Mich. 381, 8 N.W. 84 (1881).
88 The question whether a given use is reasonable is generally a factual
issue, decided by a jury in common law actions for damages, or by a judge
when the relief sought is equitable.
89 29 Mich. at 421 (dictum).
90 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 852-54 (1939) states the criterion as being
a balancing of the utility of the use against the gravity of the harm. If
harm means harm to the party who has brought the suit, the dictum in
Dumont is hardly sustainable; one factor in a balance being zero, it matters
not whether the other factor is one or infinity.
91 One writer has listed the factors which the Michigan cases indicate
that the decision maker may properly consider as "the size and velocity
of the stream; the extent of the injury; . . . the needs of important manu-
facturing interests; . . . increased population and the general welfare of
the communities affected; . . . the general usage of the country in similar
cases." Arens, supra note 75, at 382. Such a list does not seem to add
much to concretizing the test, but the cases rarely offer more.
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may determine whether defendant's conduct is reasonable or un-
reasonable without much concern for its effect on plaintiff; and if
the conduct is deemed reasonable, leave plaintiff to bear whatever
loss is involved. If, as is so often the case, plaintiff is the down-
stream riparian and defendant the upstream, this criterion in the
hands of a court inclined to liberality as to what uses are reason-
able may result in a built-in preference for upstream owners. A
pattern in this direction in the Michigan cases has been noted and
commented upon. 2
Since Dumont v. Kellogg, a number of water rights cases have
been decided by the Michigan courts on the basis of the reasonable
use test. Some of these have been pollution cases; 93 some have
involved activities affecting the stream flow through other than
withdrawal uses. 94  Few have actually involved the rights of a
riparian, such as an industry, to withdraw water for use on riparian
land.
In Dumont the court indicated that a total diversion, even by a
riparian owner, would be unreasonable per se.9 5 Three years later
the same court held that diversion of an entire stream by a riparian
occupier for use on his land is not actionable as such so long as the
water is returned to the channel in such a way that the flow to
lower riparians is not "materially diminished. '96 Somewhere be-
tween no material diminution and total flow withdrawal lies the
point at which an industrial user making a withdrawal use on ri-
parian land will be deemed to have exceeded the bounds of rea-
sonableness.9 7 The Michigan court has not yet been called upon
to find this point.
The importance of the ascertainability or predictability of this
point to an industrial user depends in part on what will happen to
92 Lauer, Water Law in Michigan, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
443 (1958); Arens, supra note 75, at 384, in which the author attributed
the preference in part to the courts' tendency not to apportion water be-
tween two reasonable users. It is not entirely clear, however, which is
cause and which effect. See, e.g., Turner Mfg. Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 12
Ohio C. Dec. 738 (Cir. Ct. 1889); Warder & Barnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 855 (C.P. Clark Co. 1885), in which quantitative apportion-
ments were decreed.
93 Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215
N.W. 325 (1927); City of Battle Creek v. Goguac Resort Ass'n, 181 Mich.
241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914); Phillips v. Village of Armada, 155 Mich. 260, 118
N.W. 941 (1908).
94 E.g., Hass v. McManus, 161 Mich. 372, 126 N.W. 462 (1910); see Du-
mont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874).
95 See discussion at note 91 supra.
96 Pettibone v. Smith, 37 Mich. 579, 582 (1877).
97 It is assumed that an industrial use would not be considered nonri-
parian or unreasonable per se. See discussion at note 17 supra. Although
this has never been expressly decided in Michigan, the industrial nature
of some of the litigants in the cases already discussed suggest the validity
of this assumption.
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him if he goes beyond it. It is clear that a riparian occupier will
be entitled to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result
of an unreasonable use by another riparian.9 8 Will every injured
claimant entitled to damages also be entitled to shut off the water
to the wrongdoer, or will the Michigan courts require something
more if injunctive relief is sought?
Four years after the Dumont decision, Hoxsie v. Hoxsie99 came
before the Michigan court. Plaintiff, a lower riparian mill owner,
asked for an injunction to restrain a private nuisance. The acts of
defendant which were alleged to be objectionable related to the
manner in which defendant retarded the flow of the stream during
some periods and permitted the stream to flow in "unusual" quanti-
ties during other periods. The trial court found defendant's use
unreasonable and issued a detailed order in which he was required
to release sufficient water to maintain at least the ordinary flow of
the stream during normal working hours, but not to release any
greater quantities than needed to run defendant's mill. On appeal
Justice Cooley, who also wrote the Dumont opinion, concluded that
the effect of the terms of the injunction was to guarantee an
uninterrupted flow to the lower owner, and that this was not regu-
lation of equal rights between riparians but a subordination of
defendant's rights to those of the plaintiff. The court indicated
that this alone was enough to make the injunction objectionable.
But the court went further and decided that plaintiff had not es-
tablished a right to any injunction at all. Even if defendant's use
was unreasonable, "in the case of rights like those here in question,
that process [injunction] is not only troublesome but susceptible of
great abuses, from the extreme difficulty of laying down any pre-
cise rule that will fit the varying circumstances."'10 0 The court
concluded that "except in very clear cases it is generally better to
leave the parties to their legal remedy in the recovery of dam-
ages."''1  The lower court was reversed and the cause dismissed.
In Buchanan v. Grand River Log Co. 10 2 a riparian mill owner
sought an injunction against a logging company that was using the
stream to float its logs to market. Plaintiff alleged that the manner
in which defendant boomed its logs caused jams that, when broken,
resulted in floods on the river. The floods plus the logs themselves
caused injury and destruction to plaintiff's mill and dam, with
resultant losses to his business. The trial court dismissed the bill.
98 The measure of damages has been stated to be "the actual damage
resulting from the failure to allow the water to flow through the.., river."
Stock v. City of Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375, 382, 119 N.W. 435, 438-39 (1909).
Arens, supra note 75, at 396, concludes that "a non-user can receive only
nominal damages for past injury."
99 38 Mich. 77 (1878).
100 Id. at 82.
101 Id.
102 48 Mich. 364, 12 N.W. 490 (1882).
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On appeal the supreme court reiterated what it had said in Hoxsie v.
Hoxsie10 3 about the difficulty of shaping an injunction to the needs
of this type of case. The court also said that denial of the injunc-
tion could be justified because plaintiff had not used the water
power for milling purposes since defendant company had been in
existence. The question, said the court, was
whether complainants are entitled to an injunction to re-
strain the commission of such acts as would impede them in
entering upon the use of a mill which has long stood idle;
their complaint being not that defendant interferes with
an existing business, but that it prevents one being estab-
lished. The legal rights of complainants are not any less by
reason of their mill having stood idle; if they own the dam
and the site, they are entitled to make use of them . . . but
the fact is an additional reason why the court should be
cautious in awarding an injunction .... 104
The decision to leave plaintiff to his remedy at law clearly indicates
the Michigan court's willingness to apply the type of reasoning
underlying the balance-of-equities doctrine. 10 5
The same reasoning was applied in a later case,10 6 in which the
court considered the effect an injunction would have on the econ-
omy of the area. Plaintiff was engaged in raising carp in a pond
supplied with water from a river at a point downstream of defend-
ant's paper mill. The effluent from the mill, which was being
dumped into the stream, adversely affected the health of the carp.
The trial court expressly found defendant's use of the stream as a
waste carrier to be unreasonable to plaintiff; damages were awarded
but an injunction denied. In affirming the lower court's decision,
the supreme court considered the respective amounts of capital in-
vested in the operations, the number of employees on the payrolls,
and the impact of the loss involved on the economy of the locale.
The court concluded that it had to agree with the trial court that
"all the equities in this case would be against granting a permanent
injunction."' 07
III. EVALUATION
Although a complete evaluation of the actual effect of the present
law on industrial water use and allocation of water nationally can-
not now be made because sufficient factual information does not
exist, it is possible to make at least a preliminary comparison of the
103 See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
104 48 Mich. at 368, 12 N.W. at 492-93.
105 See discussion at note 55 supra.
106 Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215
N.W. 325 (1927).
107 240 Mich. at 289. See also Stock v. Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375, 119 N.W.
435 (1909); Wyoming Township v. Stuart, 158 Mich. 60, 122 N.W. 214 (1909);
Howard v. Bellows, 148 Mich. 410, 111 N.W. 1047 (1907); Lauer, supra note
92 at 453.
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two legal frameworks thus far developed. Two major issues, in-
volving two basic assumptions, are often encountered in discus-
sions of water laws and their efficacy.1 0 8  The assumptions are
(1) that one major goal of the American economic and legal systems
is the protection of private investment, and (2) that there is an
affirmative public interest in the conservation and utilization of
water so as to produce the greatest economic and cultural values.
These assumptions may then be translated into two questions:
Does the law adequately protect private investment, and does it
give sufficient consideration to the public interest in optimum
water use?
A. Protection of Private Investment
From the standpoint of the industrial user of water, maximum
protection of investment can be achieved only by a guarantee of a
source of supply adequate for all his needs. Assume that an indus-
trial water user locates his plant on land riparian to a stream that
has sufficient flow, even during periods of low flow, to provide all
water needed for maximum operation. The doctrine of natural
flow, as applied in Georgia, gives the industry relatively complete
protection against others moving onto riparian land upstream and
making withdrawals sufficient to decrease the quantity available at
the plant. There is, of course, the possibility that upstream users
may qualify for the domestic user status, in which case the down-
stream industry would have no protection. 0 9 Presumably, how-
ever, domestic use would not cause a high degree of water diminu-
tion.
At the same time, the industrial user would be subject to limita-
tion because his use could not interfere with the flow to down-
stream riparians. While it is true that many industrial uses do not
involve substantial water disappearance, it is equally true that
any use will result in some loss. The fact that the downstream
riparian moved onto the stream later than the industry would not
be material. Ultimately, then, in a Georgia-type jurisdiction, maxi-
mum protection of water supply investment is obtained by locating
the plant on riparian land at the furthest downstream point that a
riparian use is possible.
The Michigan version of reasonable use offers the industrial
user less protection of investment in some ways and more in others.
For example, an upstream industry will obtain more protection of
its investment as against lower riparians than in Georgia. Under
Michigan law an upstream riparian is entitled to make some ma-
108 See, e.g., Haber, Protection of Investment, The Public Interest and
State Water Policy, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION 417 (1958). The
tentative evaluation made herein will follow the pattern used by Haber.
109 Here again it is assumed that an industrial use would qualify as a
permitted use, but not one entitled to the excepted status of domestic use.
This assumption appears to be justified.
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terial diminution of the flow downstream and still remain within
the requirement of reasonableness. In addition, priority in time
does not give priority in right under either version of riparianism.
The fact that an industry was the first to make a beneficial use
may, however, enter into a determination of whether the use is rea-
sonable. But the courts are not consistent in the weight given to
this factor.
Additional protection of investment for the upstream industry
is found in the way the Michigan courts allocate risk of loss. Even
if both upstream and downstream uses are deemed reasonable, no
remedy is available for a downstream riparian, regardless of the
extent of his injury. The Michigan courts' failure to apportion
water among reasonable uses means that the entire loss falls on
the downstream user. And even if the upstream use is unreason-
able in relation to a downstream use, the upstream use does not
necessarily become unavailable. The Michigan court has shown a
decided willingness to balance the equities even in favor of an
unreasonable use and thus permit the unreasonable user to con-
tinue his activities, although at the cost of some recompense to
the injured lower owners.
The protection thus afforded the upstream investor may operate
as a double-edged sword. If a new user moves onto the stream
above the industrial user, the new user will be entitled to a
reasonable use even though this reduces the quantity available to
the already existing downstream industry. As more and more new
uses are made upstream of the industry, the industry will have a
legal right to less and less water. Thus, maximum protection
of water supply investment is obtained by locating the plant on
riparian land at the furthest point upstream where a riparian use
is possible.
B. The Public Interest in Optimum Water Use
The public interest is in achieving optimum water use. Haber
states that "[W] ater should be allocated so that after a considera-
tion of alternative sources of supply and alternative benefits and
cost, the water ultimately is made available to those who can pro-
duce the greatest value for the community."'110 There seems little
in the natural flow doctrine to call for or even permit a court to
consciously include the public interest as a significant factor in the
decisional process. To some extent this factor is built into the
system; in Georgia, as in Michigan, there is considerable public
interest, on both economic and social levels, in various on-site uses
that require the maintenance of a substantial flow in the stream.
All types of recreational uses are included. However, to the
extent that these on-site uses are not materially affected by with-
110 Haber, supra note 108, at 420.
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drawal uses, and are adequately protected by other legal doc-
trines,"' a policy permitting a downstream nonuser to prevent the
use of water or to increase the cost to an upstream user seems to
offer little toward promotion of the public interest.
In Michigan, a recognized aspect of the reasonable use test is a
consideration of the factors bearing on the relative benefits of the
uses to the community. In addition to evaluating these factors in a
determination of what uses are permissible, these considerations
also bear weight in the determination of available remedies for
established injuries. By utilizing a criterion not tied to rights fixed
in quantitative terms, the system permits future riparians whose
uses may be deemed more beneficial to the community to obtain
water previously allocated to others. However, the exact factors
that are considered to be within the community-benefit criteria
are often not explicitly stated or consistently applied, nor has there
been clarification of the weight to be accorded these factors in
relation to other relevant factors, such as those operating to protect
private investment.
In some instances the pattern of results seems to bear little rela-
tion to a community-benefit goal. For example, it has been sug-
gested that the Michigan preference for the upper user has no
connection with community benefit in a climate where evaporation
losses are probably not great.112 If the protection of investment
factors actually tend to influence the geographic location of major
water users, it is perhaps difficult to sustain the Michigan prefer-
ence for upstream development on the basis of minimizing channel
losses from evaporation. On the other hand, it is even more diffi-
cult to sustain the Georgia preference for downstream develop-
ment on the same basis. This in a way is illustrative of the manner
in which water laws have often operated in substantial disre-
gard of water facts.
111 E.g., the doctrines relating to the public right of navigation.
112 Haber, supra note 108, at 420.
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